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Drone Warfare and Just War Theory
Harry van der Linden
INTRODUCTION
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), better known as drones, have been used by the
United States in conventional war situations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Their most
controversial purpose has been their use, especially by the Obama administration, in the
targeted killing of suspected terrorists in non-battlefield settings, notably in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan and Yemen.i Targeted killing
of civilian “militants” can also take place through cruise missile strikes, manned
aircrafts, and “boots on the ground” (as is illustrated by the killing of Osama bin Laden),
but targeted killing by drones has several distinct advantages for the United States.
Unlike targeted killing executed by counterinsurgency troops, drone targeted
killing poses few risks to the lives of US soldiers because the teams that launch and
recover drones are typically hundreds of miles away from the search and strike area,
while the teams that fly the plane (consisting of a pilot and a sensor operator controlling
the cameras), together with their supporting teams of data analysts, etc., are thousands
of miles away in the United States, watching or searching for their target until the
optimal moment has arrived to unleash the missiles. Moreover, drones are considerably
cheaper strike platforms than manned aircrafts and can stay in the air much longer (over
twenty hours). And, like cruise missiles, drones do not turn the target area into a
battlefield where humans face one another as enemies, but they are superior to cruise
missiles in terms of a much shorter strike time so that the killing can be executed on the
basis of a last- moment assessment of the intended target.ii Accordingly, it not surprising
that most US targeted killings have been executed by remote-controlled aircraft.
The targeted killings by the Obama administration show that drones enable war to
be fought in a fundamentally new way. My main aim here is to argue that drone warfare
poses moral problems and risks of such nature and magnitude that we should support an
international ban on weaponized drones and, certainly, that we should seek an
international treaty against drone systems that operate without the remote-control link;
namely, autonomous, lethal UAVs (and killer robots in general). My argument will
develop in two steps.
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First, I will articulate some moral objections to drone warfare on the basis of a
just war theory analysis of the Obama administration’s targeted killings. To make my
analysis manageable, I will focus on the drone targeted killings executed mostly under
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supervision in the FATA, but, on the whole, the
analysis also applies to the drone killings in Yemen.
The CIA drone campaign in Pakistan peaked in 2010 with 128 strikes and 751 to
1,109 “militant” and civilian casualties, and ceased as of January 2014, at the request of
the Pakistani government in order to facilitate its peace talks with the Pakistan Taliban,
one of the main armed groups operating in the FATA.iii The respite in drone strikes
might become permanent, but this would not signal a change in US policy because the
drone targeted killing is ongoing in Yemen with several strikes a month in early 2014.
Second, I will explore some additional moral objections to combat drones on the
basis of principles of “just military preparedness” or jus ante bellum (justice before
war), a new category of just war thinking. Let me begin by introducing traditional just
war theory and its normative principles.

JUST WAR THEORY
Just war theory consists of a historically evolved set of normative principles for
determining when resort to military force is just (jus ad bellum principles) and how war
can be justly executed (jus in bello principles). The most important jus ad bellum
principle is that war must have a just cause, i.e., a goal of a kind and weight that seems
to make resort to military force appropriate. Further, war must be declared by a
legitimate or right authority, and must be pursued with right intention or the just cause
as its primary motive. The three final jus ad bellum principles are that war must be a
last-resort measure (diplomacy and other nonviolent measures should generally be
pursued first); that it must have a reasonable chance of success in realizing its intended
goal; and that it must be proportional in the sense that the anticipated goods of militarily
pursuing the just cause must be commensurate with the expected harms.
The most essential jus in bello principle is the principle of discrimination, or
noncombatant immunity, which requires that combatants distinguish between civilians
and enemy combatants, and only directly attack the latter. Unintended civilian deaths
are permitted, but due care must be taken to minimize their number, and the value of the
military target must make it worth the civilian cost of life. There is also a separate jus in
bello principle of micro-proportionality, stipulating that military force should be used
economically in that the anticipated harms of a military action should not be excessive
in proportion to its military value. Traditionally, the jus ad bellum decision was seen as
chiefly the responsibility of political leaders, while using force in accordance with the
jus in bello principles fell on the shoulders of soldiers. But in a modern democracy this
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seems no longer tenable: war in all its aspects has also become the responsibility of the
citizens, and, arguably, a volunteer army entails that soldiers also have jus ad bellum
responsibility and should refuse to fight unjust wars or, at least, not re-enlist for them.
The just war principles are quite broad and general, and contemporary just war
theorists offer slightly different sets of principles, interpret the individual principles in
dissimilar ways, and give different weight to the various principles. Thus just war
theorists end up defending views that range from being rather bellicose and generally
supportive of US interventionist policies, to views that are in practice close to pacifism
and oppose most, if not all, recent US wars. Still, just war theory provides a widely
shared moral framework for addressing new moral concerns raised by the ever-changing
nature of warfare. This seems particularly important when the United Nations (UN)
Charter and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (which embody many just war
principles) may not cover new military developments and threats, such as targeted
killing by drones in response to the dangers posed by “global terrorism.” Thus the moral
analysis offered by just war theory may lead to a desire to revise the UN Charter and
IHL, or may lead one to argue against misguided efforts in that direction.
DRONE WARFARE AND JUS AD BELLUM
In a speech at the National Defense University on May 23, 2013, President Barack
Obama defended the targeted killings under his administration as morally and legally
justified acts of war, as a part of a war of self-defense against al-Qaeda and its
“associated forces” authorized by Congress in response to 9/11 in the 2001
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).iv No doubt, in light of the scope and
nature of the targeted killings executed under his authority, Obama rightly viewed them
as acts of war rather than, say, as last-resort acts of law enforcement. But were they
justified acts of war? Did they have a just cause? More specifically, the question is
whether the “militants” targeted by the Obama administration’s drone killings
constituted a clear threat against the United States of a magnitude and type such that war
acts against them were warranted. Jeff McMahan argues that the targeted killing of
terrorists as an act of self-defensive war is morally quite similar to the killing of
aggressor combatants who are asleep.v Aggressor combatants (who are in uniform),
unlike civilian aggressors (“terrorists”), have a legal right to kill on the battlefield. But
like civilian aggressors, they do not have a moral right to kill, and they intend to be
instrumental in killing persons who have done nothing to warrant this fate. We may
therefore kill both types of aggressors in order to prevent wrongful harm from being
inflicted.
This analysis provides moral support for targeted killing as an act of war only in
terms of the type of threat that is posed. What is also required for “just cause” is that the
threat has a magnitude large enough so that war becomes a reasonable option. After all,
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a limited threat does not justify the initiation of war with all its inevitable, and often
unexpected, harms. (The proportionality principle further assesses in particular cases
whether the threat outweighs the harms involved in eliminating the threat; the just cause
principle only requires the existence of a threat that meets the threshold of a serious
threat.)
Moreover, it is only when the threat to a political community is very substantive
that we may adopt the morally deeply-disconcerting war standard of killing on the basis
of hostile status (as happens in drone strikes) in addition to the commonly accepted
standard of killing in strict self-defense. Similarly, the threat must be great to warrant
the adoption of a less strict standard in war than in law enforcement for avoiding the
unintentional killing of non-hostile civilians. Typically, terrorists lack the weaponry, the
organization, and the number of participants for meeting the threat threshold of just
cause, and in that case civilian aggressors should be approached as very dangerous
criminals who should be arrested, extradited if needed, and who may only be killed or
incapacitated when they use lethal force or seek to escape. The horrific events of 9/11,
however, gave credibility to the idea that al-Qaeda posed a danger that went above the
threshold necessary for war. To be sure, the virtually unanimous support for war at the
time might have been rooted more in retributive feelings than in the conviction that war
was necessary to prevent large-scale future harms. But this only shows that the
understanding of war as punishment, rejected by most modern just war theorists, is still
prevalent.vi
Credible just war thinking must see war as not only in need of justification at the
point of its initiation, but should also assess its continuation and its various stages on the
basis of jus ad bellum principles (i.e., we should temporalize the principles).vii The Bush
administration initiated a conflict in Pakistan (beyond the conflict in Afghanistan) with
the targeted killing of civilian “militants” in the FATA. Obama hugely stepped up these
killings immediately after his inauguration in 2009: about 85 percent of around 380
strikes in Pakistan were performed under Obama’s orders.viii Did this new campaign
have a just cause? By 2009, the case that al-Qaeda constituted a threat serious enough to
qualify as a just cause had greatly weakened. Surely, no major attacks had been
launched or plotted against the United States after 9/11 that gave credibility to the view
that law-enforcement measures would be largely inadequate to meet future al-Qaeda
threats. Moreover, the war in Afghanistan had weakened al-Qaeda in this region and led
to its dispersal to other countries. It may also be noted that other countries that suffered
from horrendous terrorist attacks in the years after 2001, such as Indonesia (Bali
bombing in 2002) and Spain (Madrid bombing in 2004), had not moved away from the
law-enforcement model.
The Obama administration has never really tried to make the case that its drone
killings in Pakistan were justified in terms of self-defense, since it executed these
killings largely in secrecy. The only data we have about the number of strikes and
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people killed have been tabulated by civilian groups, based on reports by local
individuals, government officials, and journalists in a region with rather limited access.
This lack of transparency violates the requirements of the principle of legitimate
authority. Congress failed in its responsibility as legitimate authority when it authorized
the president, in the AUMF, to use US armed forces against any state, organization, or
person linked to 9/11. Obama exploited this extremely open-ended authorization in his
approval of greatly expanding US targeted killing in Pakistan, sidestepping the fact that
the CIA is not part of the “armed forces.” It should also be noted that the AUMF only
authorized the president to take action against people connected to 9/11, not those
suspected of other terrorist actions. The principle of legitimate authority demands full
transparency (rather than limited reporting to some members of Congress) because it is
only on the basis of debate and access to all facts that a body representing the people
can declare war, as a communal enterprise, in the name of the people. The same can be
said of new stages of development in a continuing war. Remarkably, it was not until
early 2012 that Obama for the first time publicly discussed his drone program, and
Congress has still not demanded a tally of the number of civilian and militant casualties
in US targeted killings.ix
Secrecy has also enabled the Obama administration to violate the principle of
right intention in its targeted killing campaign in Pakistan. Even though the killings
were justified as self-defense, they must have served other goals. Notably, in drone
strikes on Pakistan during the Obama administration, fewer than 10 percent of the
identified targets were directed against al-Qaeda, and less than 2 percent of all
“militants” killed were named leaders of al-Qaeda or other targeted organizations.x In
short, it seems that the militants killed were mostly low-level insurgents with local aims
(such as members of the Pakistan Taliban), and most strikes were not aimed at named
individuals (so-called personality strikes) but rather at individuals who fit the profile of
a militant (so-called signature strikes). The US goals (other than self-defense) seem to
have been to weaken the FATA as a basis of support for the Afghanistan Taliban and to
assist the Pakistani government in its struggle with various armed opposition groups,
such as the Pakistan Taliban, in the FATA. More broadly, the United States seems to
have been guided by the motive of maintaining, and even extending, its role as global
military hegemon. I will later suggest that the United States morally erred in pursuing
these goals; what matters now is to note that the goals show a lack of “right intention”
behind the Obama administration’s drone killings.
The various violations of the first three jus ad bellum principles by the targeted
killings in Pakistan point to several moral dangers of drone warfare. It is easy to use
drones for preventing threats or harms that remain under the threshold of just cause,
since drone warfare poses few risks for those who execute it, at least in asymmetric
conflicts. And what greatly adds to this danger is that active public support is not
needed to execute drone warfare, and that this type of war, accordingly, can easily be
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undertaken largely in secret without proper authorization and public debate, even in an
“open” society.
Moreover, drone warfare makes it easy to pursue goals that are different from the
stated goal of security that generally appeals to the public. Thus drone warfare seems to
be thus far the best enabler of war as “alienated war,” that is, war as a collective activity
that no longer requires public sacrifice and moral commitment.xi The volunteer army,
the use of private military contractors, the technology of precision bombs, and, now,
drone warfare, are all steps toward normalizing war for US citizens: war no longer feels
like war, it no longer disrupts everyday life, and, so, war becomes acceptable. Longterm “boots on the ground,” even if they are the boots of volunteers, threatens this
normalization, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have illustrated, but there is no such
time-limit problem in drone warfare. Combat drones also have been proven to be very
effective in conventional wars, as illustrated by the war in Libya. No troops on the
ground were necessary for “success” in that war, and this played a role in President
Obama simply announcing this war, rather than seeking public approval and
congressional authorization. Drone warfare, then, as almost risk-free war for US
soldiers, minimizes the number of occasions that the public is left wondering whether
war and the United States playing “global cop” is worth the sacrifices of its soldiers.
With drone warfare, the public is left free to admire the military in a cultural sort of way
only (video games, technological awe, “support the troops,” parades, etc.), while the
government is left free to pursue its political and military interests.
Drone warfare shields the US public from the reality of war, but war is still very
real at the receiving end. The buzz of the combat drones is heard overhead for hours on
end in Pakistan, leaving the local people in enduring states of deep fear since the
missiles could strike at any moment. And the strikes wreak human devastation: the total
casualties (from 2004–2013) are between 2,296 and 3,719; the non-hostile civilian
casualties are between 416 and 957, including as many as 202 children. Another 1,089
to 1,639 people have been injured.xii
Other costs of the drone strikes were that Pakistan’s sovereignty has been violated
and that the strikes have led to growing resentment among the Pakistani people against
the United States. Moreover, the strikes created fertile recruiting grounds in the FATA
for new civilian aggressors and set a bad precedent for future targeted killing campaigns
by other countries. It seems that all these costs could reasonably have been foreseen
when the drone campaign in Pakistan was expanded in 2009, and so it should have been
clear to the Obama administration that the campaign, with its uncertain and limited
threat prevention impact, would violate the proportionality principle. And, surely, the
more these costs have become impossible to ignore in subsequent years, the stronger the
case has become in terms of proportionality considerations that the campaign has to
stop.
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The Obama administration, however, claimed that its drone strikes did not violate
Pakistan’s sovereignty because that government permitted the strikes. This defense has
merit but is ultimately not convincing. A visible sign of Pakistan’s permission, at least
in the early years of the Obama drone attacks, is that the CIA launched drones not only
from Afghanistan but also from Shamsi air base in Pakistan (the United States was
evicted from the base in December 2011).xiii Similarly, we may see the fact that the
Pakistani government claimed responsibility for some drone strikes prior to 2008 as
reflective of its permission.xiv We should ask, though, how did Pakistan’s permission
came about? Was it the result of undue political pressure and conditional financial and
military aid promised by the United States, or was it significantly the outcome of the
Pakistani government’s desire to combat (with US assistance) the growing oppositional
violence and flagrant human rights violations by the Pakistan Taliban and other militant
groups in the FATA? Similarly, it is unclear what we should make of the Pakistani
government’s frequent public protests against the US drone strikes. Did the protests
reflect genuine concerns about violations of Pakistan’s sovereignty, or were they mostly
attempts to pacify the growing strong public opposition among the Pakistani people to
the strikes? So, at least, the claim that the United States did not violate the sovereignty
of the Pakistani government (state) is questionable.
But the real issue at stake is sovereignty in a broader sense, the sovereignty of the
people of Pakistan, and here the picture is much clearer: the majority of the Pakistani
people have consistently opposed drone strikes, even if the strikes were presented (in
polls) as necessary to reduce militant violence against Pakistani citizens.xv The obvious
lesson is that most Pakistanis thought (and still think) that oppositional violence in their
country is their battle to fight, and for good reason. US intervention has served as a
destabilizing force and even might have fueled the flames of the violent opposition,
exploiting anger at the “untouchability” of US military force and its arrogance of
engaging in widespread killing in “secret.” Likewise, the United States had no right to
extend its war in Afghanistan to Pakistan in order to address its failure to prevent alQaeda and many Afghanistan Taliban fighters from making the FATA their new staging
ground after the war was “won” in Afghanistan.
The Obama administration’s drone killings violate the last resort principle.
Alternatives, whether in the form of negotiations or law-enforcement measures, do not
seem to have been considered. In fact, a remarkable feature of the Obama
administration’s counterterrorism strategy is that no prisoners are taken, and thus the
problem so central to the Bush administration of how to treat captured suspected
terrorists is largely avoided. It is certainly ironic that in the same year Obama reached
out to the Islamic world and received the Nobel Peace Prize, he also greatly stepped up
the drone strikes in the FATA. The brief hope for a more multilateral and cooperative
American foreign policy was betrayed in secret by a continuation of the usual
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militarized foreign policy, clouding the prospect of finding enduring solutions for
terrorism. Thus the principle of reasonable chance of success was also violated, because
military force in accordance with this principle must lead to long-term threat reduction.
The drone strikes in the FATA might have reduced some threats posed by al-Qaeda for
the United States, but at the cost of worsening the economic and political conditions in
the area and so inducing new threats in the long run, especially for the Pakistani people.
Generally, militarized foreign policy errs in thinking that war is the answer; it fails to
recognize that military force, at best, can bring people to the point of renewing
cooperative efforts and finding nonviolent, enduring solutions for what gave rise to
violent conflict in the first place.
These violations of the final three jus ad bellum principles further underline how
drone warfare enables “alienated” war. Since targeted killing by drones does not place
US soldiers in the areas under attack, it seems that sovereignty is not violated and that
no war has been waged against the Pakistani people. Drone strikes, in other words,
appear to eliminate only “terrorists” from afar, and drones, touted as very precise
weapons,xvi can carefully excise this evil. With this mode of thought, the very fact that
drones have been harming the Pakistani people has remained largely outside the US
national discourse, and there were no US soldiers on the ground to report otherwise and
bring stories home of great human suffering. Our news about drones at war is not the
news of a country at war; at most, drone strikes are reported in the sidelines with the
number of estimated terrorists killed and the occasional mention of civilians who also
may have died. “Alienated” war is war for which people do not take full responsibility,
and combat drones facilitate this denial of responsibility.

DRONE WARFARE AND JUS IN BELLO
Granted that the Obama drone campaign in the FATA was unjust in jus ad bellum
terms, it follows that all US drone killings during this campaign were wrongful killings,
and that the just course of action would have been to request Pakistan to arrest all those
civilian militants against whom US courts would have a legal case. No doubt, this
would have been a tall order and success might have been limited, even if the Pakistani
government would have accepted US assistance. But justice comes with a price, and the
moral costs of drone killings as the alternative were much greater. Still, it remains
important to address the wrongful drone killings in jus in bello terms, both in order to
rebut the Obama administration’s view that the drone strikes were justly executed and to
point out jus in bello moral dangers of drone warfare in general. Limited data and the
scope of this chapter make it impossible to assess individual drone attacks, but the
aggregate data allow for jus in bello assessment of the Pakistani drone campaign over
the years.
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The United States has frequently executed several missile strikes in short
succession on the same target in the FATA with the result that responders to the first
strike, such as rescue workers and family members, were killed. xvii This policy violates
the principle of discrimination or noncombatant immunity because it reflects lack of due
care in seeking to minimize civilian casualties; worse even, it suggests the intentional
killing of civilians, a war crime. Besides requiring due care, the principle of
discrimination also demands that the civilian costs of individual strikes are not
excessive in light of the military value of the strikes. The percentage of civilians killed
was approximately 22 percent in 2009, 11 percent in 2010, 14 percent in 2011, 7 percent
in 2012, and as low as 0 percent in 2013.xviii Is this range of killing civilians
proportionate?
How do you decide this question? A recent defender of the drone strikes suggests
that “we can compare the number of civilians that targets are killing and the number of
civilians killed in the targeting to see which number is bigger.”xix Noting that al-Qaeda
(and its affiliates) had been responsible for over 4,400 civilian deaths throughout the
years and that at most 700 civilians had been killed in Pakistan (through 2011), this
supporter of drone strikes concludes that the civilian deaths in Pakistan were clearly not
excessive. I have already pointed out the flaw in this reasoning: the total number of
civilians killed by al-Qaeda is as such not an adequate reflection of the threat level
posed by this group in 2009, when Obama stepped up the drone warfare in Pakistan.
Certainly, there is no evidence to support the notion that the drone campaign against alQaeda has saved the lives of even remotely as many US civilians as the number of
Pakistani civilians killed during this campaign. Proportionality seems to demand that the
estimated number of saved lives should be much higher.xx
Another argument to the effect that the civilian-killing percentage of the drone
warfare in Pakistan was acceptable is that alternative military strategies, such as putting
boots on the ground, would have led to greater numbers of civilians killed. xxi Generally,
it might be true that non-drone counterterrorism operations may result in more civilian
deaths—soldiers, for example, may be more discriminate than drones (they know who
shoots at them), but more civilians might be caught in crossfire in a ground battle. But
one cannot conclude that since one operational strategy brings fewer civilian deaths than
another that, therefore, this strategy has an acceptable rate of civilian deaths. After all,
the other strategy might be grossly disproportionate. At best, the comparative
proportionality advantage of drone warfare helps to explain why drone warfare is a
preferred US option. It also might be a factor in the United States opting for drone
warfare in regions where it would not use traditional conventional military force.
Officials of the Obama administration have regularly emphasized that combat
drones are very accurate weapons and so lead to very minimal civilian deaths. Former
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defense secretary Leon Panetta, for example, claimed in 2011 that drones “are probably
the most precise weapons in the history of warfare.”xxii However, the very fact that
drone technology has accurate capabilities in terms of identifying its target and then
striking the target with a limited blast area does not mean that due care is taken to avoid
civilian casualties. The fact that the number of civilian casualties decreased greatly the
more drone warfare in Pakistan was protested and subjected to public scrutiny suggests
that the capability of technological accuracy in the early years of the Obama drone
campaign in Pakistan went hand in hand with a lack of “moral accuracy.” Relatedly,
precision in finding and hitting the target does not imply that there is precision in the
selection of the target.xxiii
The Obama administration’s process of naming the militants it puts on its killing
lists is shrouded in secrecy and might not be very reliable. Flawed intelligence may lead
to misidentification of civilians as hostile militants. It also should be noted that there is
no general agreement on the criteria for determining the hostile status of civilians in the
first place. The bomb maker of al-Qaeda is a threat, but what about the propaganda
maker, the paid armed chauffeur, or a seemingly inactive member? The little we know
about the identities of “militants” killed by the Obama administration suggests that it
adheres to a rather broad understanding of what counts as being militant. Signature
strikes, with their vague killing standard of “fitting the profile of hostile militants,” add
greatly to the problem that many people killed might have been misidentified or
mischaracterized. Accordingly, the Obama administration’s claim of limited unintended
civilian deaths, even if taken at face value, is misleading in that drone strikes may have
killed many people conceived of as militants who were actually civilians. Even the data
gathered by various civilian groups might over-report the number of genuine militants,
since often the only evidence for claiming that the casualties were militants is the
reporting by “anonymous Pakistani officials,” presumably army officials with an
interest in having broad standards of militancy and pleasing the US military. xxiv Thus the
unintended civilian deaths of the drone campaign in Pakistan might be considerably
greater than the mere numbers or percentages of “civilians killed” suggest, so that the
campaign, even in its later years, might have been to some degree disproportionate.
The principle of micro-proportionality prohibits excessive use of force, taking
into consideration both civilian and militant casualties. Based on the assumption that the
goal of the drone campaign in Pakistan was to eliminate threats posed by al-Qaeda,
signature strikes violate this principle because, surely, there was no way of telling
whether an individual who fit the profile of “militant” belonged to al-Qaeda or some
other militant group. Moreover, since, as previously noted, less than 10 percent of all
drone strikes in Pakistan (during the Obama administration) were specifically directed
against al-Qaeda, military force was used excessively in terms of the stated goal of
combatting “global terrorism” because no attempt was made to avoid the killing of
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militants with local aims only, and their deaths had only marginal value with respect to
the goal of weakening al-Qaeda.
In sum, all the praise of combat drones as very precise killing machines obscures
difficult moral problems of setting (and executing) morally convincing standards for
determining the hostile status of civilians and of deciding what counts as
disproportionate civilian deaths. Similar problems also emerge with regard to defining
military targets in civilian settings. Technological accuracy lulls people into thinking
that “moral accuracy” has been reached, making drone warfare a more acceptable form
of warfare. What further enables the comfort of drone warfare as “alienated war” is that
US military superiority leaves people unconcerned that drone warfare brings war home
in a manner that raises significant jus in bello concerns: military drone pilots are
combatants during their working hours on their base and they “hide” their combatant
status after work when they mix into the civilian population and return home. Moreover,
the CIA agents who assist in drone strikes are civilians who help to kill civilian militants
who are blamed for hiding their hostile intentions.xxv

TARGETED KILLING: BETWEEN WAR AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
In his speech at the National Defense University, Obama not only defended his drone
warfare record, but he also looked at the future of the war against global terrorism. xxvi
He said: “America is at a crossroads. We must define the nature and scope of this
struggle, or else it will define us. We have to be mindful of James Madison’s warning
that ‘No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.’” More
specifically, Obama reiterated his commitment to bring the troops home from
Afghanistan and proposed that we no longer define US counterterrorism as a “global
war on terror,” but rather “as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific
networks of violent extremists that threaten America.” These “targeted efforts” foremost
refer to drone strikes, and, apparently, Obama seems to think that the continuation of
targeted killing strikes, at a reduced rate thanks to “the progress we’ve made against
core al-Qaeda,” is no longer really war. Correspondingly, he said that he would like
Congress and the American people to engage “in efforts to refine, and ultimately repeal,
the AUMF’s mandate.”
Concomitant with the speech at National Defense University, the White House
released a fact sheet,xxvii outlining standards (taken from a classified Presidential Policy
Guidance on targeted killing) for how to use lethal force against terrorists in countries
where the United States is not at war. In short, the standards permit a drone attack
against a terrorist only if capture is not feasible, local authorities will not or cannot take
effective measures to deal with the “imminent threat to U.S. persons,” and there is “near
certainty that the terrorist target is present” and “near certainty that non-combatants will
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not be injured or killed.” The “fact sheet” maintains that the standards “are either
already in place or will be transitioned into place.”
What are we to make of these standards and the proclaimed “end” of the war on
terror? It is clear that the standards have not been fully implemented in the ongoing
drone war in Yemen, but then an Obama administration spokesperson said in April
2014, almost a year after the first announcement of the new standards, that “I’m not
going to speculate on how long the transition [toward the new standards] will take, but
we’re going to ensure that it’s done right and not rushed.”xxviii The “end” of the war on
terror and the new standards are attempts to normalize war and so ensure that war
remains “alienated war.” By emphasizing that the continuation of drone killings of
civilian militants is not a continuation of the “war on terror” and can be done with a
refinement or even repeal of the AUMF, Obama seems to want the American public to
accept a permanent war that is no longer called war. And, of course, the legal
restrictions of the homeland security state, so typical of being at war, will largely remain
in effect. What the Obama administration also seems to be doing is to push targeted
killings by drones in the direction of a hybrid model of the war and law-enforcement
legal models of the use of force, following the example of the Bush administration’s
hybrid treatment of captured terrorists. Targeted killing by drones might not meet the
level of intensity of conflict to be legally counted as war (it is “force away from hot
battlefields”), but it still uses force in a manner typical of war, that is, hostile status
killing (with some fine-tuning perhaps in terms of the scope of acceptable civilian
deaths). And so a hybrid model might give greater respectability to US targeted killing
by drones, avoiding censure that might come from either the war model or lawenforcement model of the use of force. Further, combat drones, it is widely admitted, do
not meet legal obstacles as such when used in conventional war theaters. Thus, we
would be led toward a world in which drone warfare would be the new legal “normal,”
both in international conflicts and armed conflicts with non-state actors. Would a just
military and society want such a world?

COMBAT DRONES, KILLER ROBOTS, AND JUS ANTE BELLUM
Just war theorists tend to look at each war as a separate moral event, paying little
attention to the fact that how we prepare for war has a great impact on how likely it is
that war will be justly initiated and executed. To address this shortcoming I have
articulated in some prior essays a new category of just war thinking, “just military
preparedness,” with principles that set forth requirements for the military as a just
institution.xxix In line with the commonly used naming of the other just war theory
categories, the new category may be called jus potentia ad bellum or, more briefly (but
less accurately), jus ante bellum. Just military preparedness addresses two justice
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concerns. First, it raises questions about whether the military preparation of a country
is just toward its military personnel, places a fair burden on the civilian population, and
the like. Second, it raises questions about whether the military preparation of a country
is such that it is conducive to the country resorting to force only when justice is on its
side and to executing war justly. The ultimate concern of jus ante bellum as part of just
war theory is military preparedness that is just in the second sense, but justice in the
first sense must also be addressed since it impacts the possibility of justice in the
second sense. In what follows, I will discuss five jus ante bellum principles,
emphasizing the first two principles since they have the greatest bearing on the
question of whether a just military would want to include drones in its preparation for
the possibility of war.
The first principle says that the basic defense structure of a country should
accord with its general purpose of using military force only for the sake of protecting
people against extensive basic human rights violations caused by large-scale armed
violence. This principle of “just purpose” requires that a country is able to meet acts of
aggression and has the capacity to contribute to the collective tasks of assisting other
countries in their self-defense and preventing humanitarian catastrophes caused by
armed force (humanitarian intervention). The United States, with its relentless pursuit
of military superiority, its professional army of around 1.4 million active duty
personnel, its “empire of bases,”xxx and its military expenditures close to 50 percent of
global military spending and five times the size of the second-largest spender (China),
is in clear violation of this principle. The US military does not seek capability of selfdefense and global security through collective efforts, but rather aims at military
hegemony and global “power” projection to serve its political and economic needs.
The first principle requires that new military technology is introduced only if
it is necessary for, or conducive to, the global protection of basic human rights. In
the past, new military technology has often been developed by a party in order to
gain advantage in a conflict that otherwise could not have been won or only won at
very great human costs. But this does not describe how during the past few decades
the United States has introduced new military technology. The main motivations
behind its continuous military technological innovations seem to be the desire to
maintain military superiority and dominance and to satisfy huge financial interests at
stake in the research, development, production, and sale of new weapons. The
introduction of combat drones illustrates this point. Drone warfare extends the
global reach of US military power, and major weapon industries are increasingly
investing in further developing and producing combat drones. A recent report for
Congress, for example, projects that the Department of Defense will spend around
$13 billion on the Reaper, the current combat drone of choice in targeted killing,
between 2011 and 2020.xxxi Now the problem with new military technologies is that
they tend to spread to other countries, and this is certainly happening with combat
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drones. Thus we may fairly soon live in a world in which a significant number of
countries (e.g., China, Russia, India, and Iran) will use combat drones in war zones
as well as nonwar zones and engage in the targeted killing of their “terrorists,” their
militants seeking secession, etc. This danger of a highly destabilized world with
military violence exercised by many countries outside their borders and off the
battlefield is a clearly foreseeable risk. So, had the US military been just in terms of
military preparedness, it would not have introduced combat drones.
Some recent defenders of combat drones have argued that they might actually
be used in the service of protecting human rights. The basic argument is that
countries such as the United States with a low tolerance for casualties among its
troops might use drones to execute humanitarian interventions it would otherwise
not have executed for being too risky to the troops.xxxii Here the argument that
combat drones make war too easy is turned around: it is a good thing that it becomes
easier to intervene in unfolding humanitarian crises. And the punch line is that
“humanitarian drones” were already very effective in the “humanitarian
intervention” in Libya, and that future “ground drones” (remote-controlled mobile
strike platforms) would be of even greater assistance in meeting humanitarian
goals.xxxiii
One problem with this argument is that most of what happened in Libya was
not a humanitarian intervention in accordance with U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1973,xxxiv but rather NATO choosing a side in a civil war and actively
supporting the overthrow of Qaddafi. Another problem is that it is unclear how
combat drones could effectively protect populations under threat and actually stop
génocidaires in their tracks. What seems more plausible is that killing from above
would fan the flames on the killing fields. Similarly, drones on the ground would not
seem particularly effective in defusing human hatred in action. A much better
alternative is to create a permanent rapid intervention force under UN authority,
specially trained for peacekeeping and dealing with violent humanitarian conflicts
and composed of soldiers from across the globe. This would avoid reinforcing the
role of the United States as military hegemon and it would make addressing
humanitarian crises a collective responsibility, not requiring US soldiers alone to
risk their lives.
Combat drones are quite vulnerable to attack from modern air-defense
systems, and so the United States is developing stealth drones and drones with airto-air attack abilities. Especially noteworthy is the stealth X-47B with its ability to
land and take off from aircraft carriers.xxxv It has a much larger flying range than
current weaponized UAVs and it can fly itself. So the future seems to be that US
combat drones will be used in more conflicts, will begin to replace even the most
advanced manned aircrafts, and can reach all the corners of the world. Also, the X47B points to a future where the human role is limited to overriding the decisions of
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unmanned killing systems, as a step toward fully autonomous systems where
humans are taken out of the loop altogether, and the killer robots “select” their own
targets and “decide” on their own when to pull the trigger. Generally, drone pilots
and sensors have limitations of concentration, duration, and processing data, and so
there is a push toward taking them out of the loop or at least limiting their role.
Other developments in the US military pipeline include the miniaturization of UAVs
(micro killer drones), drones operating in swarms, and weaponized underwater
unmanned vehicles (UUVs).
The move toward autonomous lethal systems, or “killer robots,” in the air, on
the ground, or undersea will further increase some of the moral dangers noted with
regard to remote-control killing. The threshold for resorting to force will be further
lowered because the risks to soldiers will be further minimized. The illusion that
borders can be crossed without violation of sovereignty will become even more
compelling, and political leaders will be even less inclined to seek public
authorization for war. Robotic warfare is also likely to strengthen war as alienated
war for those who have the robots on their side. Robots seem to promise security
without human costs; no tears need be shed over fallen robots. But, here again, we
must wonder what would happen if other countries catch up with the United States,
or even surpass it in killer robot innovations. Robotic killers have neither loyalty nor
mercy and will kill for all who can afford them, the just and unjust alike, including
non-state actors. Their presence will be a great threat to human rights unless one
assumes that in the future all centers of political and economic power somehow
miraculously coalesce with all the centers of justice, leaving robots only to fight
unjust militants at the periphery. More likely, it will be a world of extreme
asymmetric warfare, in which robots fight civilian militants who in some cases
rightfully and other cases wrongfully refuse to obey the policies of the controllers of
the killer robots. Ironically, in a world in which there is a diminishing number of
human soldiers to fight, militant civilians might increasingly turn in desperation to
attacking civilians under the protection of killer robots.
The second jus ante bellum principle—the moral competency and autonomy
principle—demands that military personnel be educated and trained with the just
purpose of resort to force (articulated in the first principle) in mind, and be treated as
morally competent and autonomous agents. Part of the rationale of this principle is
that it is deeply immoral to turn soldiers into mere instruments of the state, deny
them the opportunity to exercise their jus ad bellum responsibility, and let them pay
the moral and psychological costs of coming to reject a war through the experience
of fighting the war. All too often soldiers come to regret their participation in war.
Yet, it does not seem to be the case that the US military is encouraging any
independent jus ad bellum thinking among its troops or even officers.xxxvi The
second principle further requires that combatants are trained to become experts in
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protecting human rights, and this includes, but is not limited to, taking on jus in
bello responsibility. The US military is somewhat more successful in training its
soldiers in jus in bello responsibility, partly because the changed nature of warfare,
notably counterinsurgency by US ground troops in Iraq and especially Afghanistan,
has necessitated better training in this regard: military success requires winning the
hearts and minds of local civilian populations. Nevertheless, there are many
documented instances of the commission of war crimes by US forces.xxxvii
Drone warfare is likely to have some eroding impact on soldiers taking on jus
ad bellum responsibility and strictly adhering to jus in bello norms. The justice of
their war should be of equal concern to remote-control soldiers and soldiers on the
physical battlefield. But remote-control soldiers have a reduced incentive to ponder
the issue since they are not risking their lives as are the traditional soldiers.
Moreover, since drone operators are not directly experiencing the consequences of
their actions, they are less likely to come to question whether justice is indeed on
their side. Also, unlike traditional soldiers, drone soldiers cannot get feedback from
enemy soldiers or local civilians that might lead them to address jus ad bellum
issues.
With regard to jus in bello norms, killing in a remote-controlled way seems to
invite less due care in trying to avoid violating these norms because one can
experience the harm that one has caused only in a mediated way. To be sure,
remote-control killers, like killers on the physical battlefield, see the harm they have
caused—and PTSD has been reported among drone operators.xxxviii But it is also the
case that the drone killers are only watching a monitor, that they watch without
being seen, that they do not hear the sounds of suffering, and that they watch with
others, and all these features seem to create emotional distance and with it moral
distance and greater risk of moral indifference.xxxix What seems to add to the
unreality of the harm and the risk of moral sliding is that the mediated battlefield
experience is an interruption of everyday life with family, driving to and from work,
and so on.
Even if one were to conclude that drone warfare as such is not likely to have
some erosive moral impact on a military that seeks to adhere to moral standards, there
is still the problem that effective drone operators may simply be skilled gamers who
think flying a drone is a cool video game. The drone soldiers do not need courage;
they do not need to feel a loyalty to fellow soldiers or country that requires them to be
prepared to risk their lives; they do not have to face their victims and confront the fact
that the video game is not really a game; and they do not even have to be paid very
well (say, as compared to mercenaries, who risk their lives but fight without political
allegiance). In short, drone warfare enables war to be partly executed by human
agents who are the very opposite of the human agents who may justifiably use force
according to the second jus ante bellum principle: agents committed to protecting
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human rights and using force only for the sake of this purpose. For a just military, the
fact that flying drones might be outsourced to skilled gamers with no concern for
protecting human rights would be an additional reason not to embrace drone warfare.
Combat drones operative in war zones do not seem to pose direct moral
problems for soldiers on the ground as long as a clear command structure is in place.
However, once drones morph into autonomous lethal systems, this will change. When
human soldiers and killer robots fight side by side, the robots will place significant
limits on the scope of decision making of human soldiers, and the human soldiers
may be helpless to prevent situations when robots malfunction, misjudge a threat, use
excessive force, or violate the laws of war. And, these jus in bello violations may also
emerge when robots fight on their own in both war and non-war zones. Proponents of
fully autonomous killing systems have argued that such problems can be
circumvented by designing killer robots so that jus in bello constraints are integrated
into their artificial intelligence. Even better, they argue, killer robots lack emotions of
anger and hatred that may lead human soldiers to commit jus in bello crimes. In
response, it should be noted that it is doubtful that machines will any time soon, if
ever, have the capacity to act in accordance with the laws of war, and so there is the
definite danger that killer robots will be developed and used that fall significantly
short in this regard. Moreover, why should we assume that all militaries would even
want to build these constraints into their killer robots? To be sure, unjust militaries
may also use and train rogue soldiers, but unlike rogue killer robots, most human
killers have some emotive resistance to killing that may at least offer some protection
for non-hostile civilians, surrendering combatants, and the like.xl
The third principle of just military preparedness—the principle of priority to
nonviolence—demands that preference be given to nonmilitary means of preventing
extensive basic human rights violations caused by armed force. In theory, the Obama
administration seems to agree with this principle and the criticism it implies with
regard to US military preparation. In his speech at the National Defense University,
Obama said: “[F]oreign assistance cannot be viewed as charity. It is fundamental to
our national security. And it’s fundamental to any sensible long-term strategy to
battle extremism. Moreover, foreign assistance is a tiny fraction of what we spend
fighting wars that our assistance might ultimately prevent.”xli Similarly, Obama’s first
defense secretary, Robert M. Gates, argued for a “balanced strategy,” noting that
there is a definite misbalance in US spending on the “war on terror” because “over
the long term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory.” He
continued, “Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be
subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs
that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented,
from whom the terrorists recruit.”xlii
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In practice, however, the Obama administration has done little to bring US
military preparation closer to satisfying the third jus ante bellum principle. The State
Department/USAID budget, which also includes billions of dollars in military
assistance, has been flat under the Obama administration after significant increases
during the Bush administration, and has been consistently less than 10 percent of the
Department of Defense budget (which in itself is considerably less than total US
military spending). In short, the Obama administration’s foreign policy is
thoroughly militarized, and this supports my earlier argument that it is implausible
to see the drone warfare in Pakistan as satisfying the jus ad bellum principle of last
resort. More broadly, as long as the United States spends so little on foreign aid,
diplomacy, peace education, arms control, refugee assistance, and the numerous
nonmilitary programs of the United Nations as compared to its military spending,
we have good reason to doubt that any future US war will satisfy the principle of
last resort.
The fourth jus ante bellum principle—the principle of proper balance of
values and resource allocation—requires that the value of security (against the threat
of widespread basic human rights violations by armed force) and the resources
committed to this value are carefully balanced against other values that good
government should promote (e.g., education and health) and the resources set aside
for their realization. US governments after World War II have consistently violated
this principle by disproportionate military spending, and one enabling factor has
been to stoke the flames of fear, from exaggerating the threat of communism to
exaggerating the threat of terrorism. Surely, if, say, 50 percent of the money spent
on the war on terrorism would have been spent on improving traffic safety,
preventive health care, cancer research, and a cleaner environment, many more
human life years in the United States would have been saved than this war, even on
the most fantastic threat assumptions, ever could have prevented. xliii Moreover, the
money so spent would have enhanced the quality of life for millions of Americans.
But the politics of fear sells. Politicians, the military brass, weapons producers, and
many research scientists profit from the “military-industrial complex.” And the
“empire of bases” guarantees access to essential material resources. All these
interests are extraneous to the concern of having a military for protecting human
rights, and they cast into doubt the jus ad bellum required “right intention” behind
any (future) US interventions.
Military research and development (R&D) may have significant civilian
payoffs. For example, the civilian drone industry is expected to boom in the coming
years, and the current R&D in robotic warfare systems may sooner or later also
bring considerable civilian benefits. This very fact, however, does not mean that the
typically more than 50 percent of the government-supported R&D spent on defense
is not a violation of the fourth jus ante bellum principle. For one thing, the road
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through military R&D to various civilian applications is an indirect one, and so it is
a road that costs much more in terms of human resources and talent than it would
had the civilian products been pursued directly. For another thing, we cannot assume
that the civilian payoffs of military R&D always match with items high on our
civilian R&D lists. Relatedly, the argument that military spending is good for the
economy fails. Military production comparatively creates few jobs, and so we would
create many more employment opportunities by, say, investing in mass transit or
installing solar panels than by manufacturing combat drones.xliv
The fifth and final jus ante bellum principle—the principle of competent and
right authority—demands that matters of military preparedness be settled by a
recognized authority competent to make such decisions, with the right intention,
aiming for just military preparedness rather than extraneous interests. In a
democratic society, the representatives of the people should be this competent and
right authority, requiring them to communicate openly and honestly with the citizens
about the costs and benefits of alternative “just military preparedness” proposals.
The defense budget should be transparent to the representatives. Guided by broad
public input, they should allocate resources on the basis of careful balancing of the
value of security against other governmental goals. Clearly, US military
preparedness fails to satisfy these guidelines in several respects. Congressional
representatives relentlessly push for military investments to keep jobs in their
districts and please their campaign contributors, even beyond what the Pentagon
might want (as illustrated by the budget fight over the F-22 Raptor aircraft).xlv
Significant parts of the Pentagon budget are secret, including allocations for special
operation forces. Weapons industries routinely have huge overruns and are a
revolving door for politicians and military brass. And, the corporate media seldom
question global US military presence.
The introduction of drone warfare illustrates how the United States fails in
terms of the competent and right authority principle. The first combat drone, the
Predator, was developed as a surveillance system and used as such in the Balkan wars
in the mid-1990s. After 9/11, the Bush administration authorized the CIA to retrofit the
Predator with Hellfire missiles and kill “high-value targets” of its own choosing, and in
early 2002 this form of warfare was first executed. In short, drone warfare became
deeply embedded in US counterinsurgency strategy before it came to public
awareness. Similarly, it is not clear how far the Pentagon has traveled down to the road
to robotic warfare and where it actually wants to go, but at least public concerns are
being raised now. Perhaps in response, the Department of Defense issued a directive
on “Autonomy in Weapon Systems” on November 21, 2012.xlvi A somewhat positive
point is that the directive approves only the development of fully autonomous weapon
systems with nonlethal capabilities, but the restriction is in effect for only five years
and can be waived by top officials.xlvii A clear negative point is that “semi-autonomous
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weapon systems” with lethal capabilities are fully embraced. The dividing line
between semi- and full autonomy is that humans in semi-autonomous systems must
select the target that the systems pursue and destroy, and this line can be easily crossed
once the R&D for semi-autonomous weapons systems has been completed.xlviii
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
In 2009, the International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC) called for a
discussion to consider an international ban on autonomous weapon systems, and in
2012, Human Rights Watch actually called for a ban. In April 2013, Christof Heyns,
UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, wrote a
comprehensive report on lethal autonomous robotics (LARs). He noted, “there is
widespread concern that allowing LARs to kill people may denigrate the value of life
itself.” Heyns called on all countries “to declare and implement national moratoria on
at least the testing, production, assembly, transfer, acquisition, deployment and use of
LARs until such time as an internationally agreed upon framework on the future of
LARs has been established.”xlix And also in April 2013, a broad international coalition
of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) launched the Campaign to Stop Killer
Robots. The proposal for a global ban on fully autonomous weapons is morally
convincing and politically tenable. The moral risks involved in the use of these
weapons are easy to recognize. Since the weapons are still in a state of development,
we are not faced with the hard task of trying to turn back the clock, as a proposal to
ban remote-controlled weaponized UAVs would imply. Indeed, the political tenability
of “stop killer robots” is underlined by the fact that during the 2013 meeting of states
party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), it was decided to organize
a four-day meeting of experts in May 2014 on “lethal autonomous weapons systems.”l
So should we forget about trying to ban our current combat drones?
One major concern with our current combat drones is that they are a stepping
stone to fully autonomous weapons. A ban of killer robots would take care of this
concern. Another major worry is that our current combat drones enable targeted killing
campaigns in nonwar zones. These campaigns violate international law, li and so we
may wish to call for a stricter enforcement of international law rather than a campaign
to stop remote- control killing by drones. Still, for three reasons, we should continue to
work toward banning our present combat drones. First, it is the case that killing by
remote control makes it too easy to resort to war, enables alienated war, and places too
few demands on its executioners. Second, it is not at all clear that calling for stricter
international law enforcement will be successful. International law is fluid and the US
drone campaigns seem to gradually create their own legal norms. Third, killing by
drones is an affront to humanity, a form of killing that we should ban on this ground
alone.lii
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Robert Sparrow recently noted that “there is something inherently dishonorable
about killing people one is observing on a video screen from thousands of kilometers
away and who have no opportunity to return fire.” He adds, “[t]his is, I think, a
widespread and powerful intuition but it turns out to be remarkably hard to unpack.” liii
I agree on both scores, but let me nonetheless try to say a few words about what might
be behind the intuition. There are several features of drone killing that raise moral
concerns, but these features are shared with other weapons that don’t raise the same
moral recoiling. Drone killing is risk-free killing, but in current modern warfare this is
hardly a distinctive feature of drone killing. Due to US military superiority, pilots of
manned planes run very few risks (other than mechanical failings and pilot errors), and
unleashing cruise missiles from a ship is also virtually risk-free. Fighters killed by
drones have no opportunity to return fire, but this is also true for cruise missiles.
Similarly, militants killed by drones are not given an opportunity to surrender, but
again, this is also true for cruise missiles. Drones have been criticized as fundamentally
asymmetric weapons, giving no fighting chance to the enemy, but again this is not
unique to drones: witness the utter destruction wrought by US aerial bombing
campaigns. What is, however, distinctive about drones is that they are deadly
surveillance platforms. The target is watched, sometimes for days on end, and then
killed. Is it the power of being able to extinguish life at the moment of one’s choosing
that is deeply morally disturbing here? That surely seems important, but the most
morally disturbing feature is that in watching the militant to be killed, one is gradually
watching a person to be killed. In other words, during the time of watching, the target
turns from a threat into a human being, and then the kill becomes the kill of this human
being. So, to come back to McMahan’s claim that the targeted killing of a militant is
similar to killing a sleeping aggressor soldier, it should be noted that an attack at night
when enemy soldiers are asleep might not be wrong, but to watch a soldier asleep for
some time and experience his humanity rather than his hostile status, and then pull the
trigger, is deeply wrong. To go after humanity instead of the threat is an affront to
humanity, and this is what remote killing by drones often involves.liv
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